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e broader aim of Mind Ascribed1 is to demonstrate that interpretivism,
even though it is oen put down, is a serious contender as a general account
of the mind. A narrower aim is to present, defend and further develop a
specic version of interpretivism: the ascription theory.
e rst chapter of the book introduces some basic notions like ‘mind’
and ‘content’ and outlines the background assumptions of the theory con-
cerning truth and meaning. Crucially, the concept of mind is understood
through the lens of folk psychology and an interpretivist position is put for-
ward about the mind thus understood. An important distinction is made
between representational content and the possession of content. To account
for the content is in the rst instance to attempt to solve the problem of
intentionality, that is, to explain how intentional states could be about the
world. To account for the possession of content, by contrast, is to explain
what it takes to have states with content, and this is where the focus ofMind
Ascribed lies. More generally, the book concentrates upon accounts that pur-
port to tell us what it is to possess mental properties.
e book consists of three parts.e rst part “Towards interpretivism”
aims tomake room for the interpretivist approach by criticising themain al-
ternative metaphysical positions, and it introduces the major current forms
of interpretivism. e second part, titled “Elaborating and defending the
ascription theory”, presents the essentials of the ascription theory and pro-
vides a reply to the main objections traditionally directed against interpre-
tivism. e third part “Extending the view” shows the viability of the ap-
proach by applying it to such topics as mental causation, perception and
self-knowledge.
e second chapter begins with the introduction of the overall meta-
physical framework for the whole book.e cornerstone of this framework
is the distinction between the inationary and deationary notion of a prop-
erty. Properties in the inationary sense are presumed to characterize how
objects really are, independently of how we choose to describe them. Prop-
1 Mölder, B. (2010). Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism, John Ben-
jamins, Amsterdam.
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erties in the deationary sense are description-dependent. To say that an ob-
ject has a certain property in the deationary sense amounts to nothingmore
than saying that a certain predicate applies to this object. Using Stephen
Schier’s term, I call properties in the deationary sense ‘pleonastic prop-
erties’, and more generally all deationary entities ‘pleonastic entities’. What
there are in the world, are then called ‘natural entities’ or the ‘natural basis’
of the ascription of pleonastic properties. It is argued that most accounts of
the mind do not require inationary mental entities, and if they do, as in the
case of role functionalism, separate objections to it are developed. Among
the accounts of the mind-body relationship that are critically analysed and
rejected in the course of the chapter are various supervenience claims, to-
ken and type identity theories as well as role and realiser functionalism. An
exception is the global supervenience of pleonastic mental properties on the
whole natural world. e ascription theory is compatible with this, but this
is not much more informative than saying that the theory is broadly natu-
ralistic.e upshot of the discussion in chapter 2 is that the mental does not
present ontological worries in any substantial sense.ere is only the task of
explaining the pleonastic mental properties, and progress on this front can
be made by concentrating on the meaning and the application conditions of
mental terms.
Chapter 3 introduces interpretivism as a position in the philosophy of
mind. Taken broadly, it is the view that interpretation plays a crucial role in
what it takes to have mental properties. ere are various ways to construe
the interpretivist view, depending on the role of interpretation in the posses-
sion ofmental states. At one extreme it could take the formof a revelationism
that sees interpretation as a helpful but ultimately dispensable guide to inde-
pendently existing mental states. At the other extreme lies pure ascriptivism
that takes the issue of whether one has a particular mental state as purely a
matter of interpretation. Between these extremes lies intermediate interpre-
tivism: interpretation is constitutive of the possession of mental states in the
sense that it cannot be eliminated from the full account of the latter, but at
the same time there are objective standards and facts constraining the inter-
pretation.emain part of the chapter outlines and analyses the accounts of
Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett, both of whom can be seen as tower-
ing gures on the interpretivist landscape. I also draw out some of themajor
respects in which my approach departs from theirs. For instance, I do not
assume that interpretation requires that its objects are rational. My approach
enlarges the admissible sources of evidence for interpretation, and thus, in
contrast with Davidson, my project is not a form of radical interpretation.
In addition, the ascription theory does not attempt to give a general account
of meaning. Instead it presumes that words such as mental state terms and
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the words used to specify mental contents have commonly shared mean-
ings. What xes those meanings is to be explained by a substantial theory of
meaning, which should complement the ascription theory.
Chapter 4 opens the second part of the book. e second part is ded-
icated to my specic version of interpretivism: the ascription theory. is
chapter claries the role of folk psychology in our understanding of themen-
tal and delineates what commitments the ascription theory has with regard
to folk psychology. In short, folk psychology is seen as providing the princi-
ples that guide the application of mental terms.is, however, does not en-
tail a commitment to problematic common-sense functionalism: the view
that themeanings ofmental terms are xed by the functional roles that these
terms play in the folk theory. e chapter also discusses the reference of
mental terms and rejects the strategy of construing questions concerning
the reality and status of mental states in reference-theoretic terms.
Chapter 5 propounds the ascription theory. It is an account of what it
takes to possess mental states with contents and its essential idea is that
for one to have a mental state s with content p is for this state (with con-
tent) to be ascribable to one according to a certain non-trivial standard. An
ascription that meets this standard is a canonical ascription. Accordingly,
the possession condition for a mental state is that it is canonically ascrib-
able. e ascription of mental states is based on evidence from the follow-
ing sources: the subject’s behaviour, the environmental stimuli aecting the
subject, other mental states ascribable to the subject, and the subject’s per-
sonal background. A canonical ascription is an ascription that meets the
following two conditions: 1) it approximates maximum coherence with the
sources of evidence; and 2) if the ascription were in fact made, it would not
require revision. e second clause is needed in order to relax the canoni-
cality standard so that ordinary people could meet it; for otherwise, only the
ideal interpreter could make canonical ascriptions.
e chapter also outlines the stance of the ascription theory with regard
to the uncodiability and the indeterminacy of the mental: the account em-
braces the former, but rejects the latter.
What about the various objections to interpretivism that have led many
to reject the approach? Chapter 6 subjects the most common objections to
close scrutiny and responds to them from the point of view of the ascription
theory. ese include the worry that the account is circular and involves a
vicious regress, or that it is both too liberal and chauvinist about the range
of beings and systems which could have mental states. In addition, there are
both the concern that the approach makes having mental states observer-
dependent and the concern that the approach fails to do justice to intrinsic
intentionality.ese too are either eased or dispelled.
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at the ascription theory can reply to common objections against in-
terpretivism constitute an indirect case for the position. A direct argument
for intermediate interpretivism is presented in the second half of the chapter.
e argument relies upon the assumption thatmental states are recognition-
dependent entities and the fact that mental states are couched in folk psy-
chological terms.
e third part of the book engages with applications of the ascription
theory. Chapter 7 places the issue of mental causation under examination.
Its aim is to account formental causation in a way that would permit a causal
role for mental states without construing them as internal states with causal
powers. e account adapts Frank Jackson’s and Philip Pettit’s distinction
between causal ecacy and causal relevance. It is only inationary or nat-
ural entities that can be causally ecacious. Given that all mental entities
are pleonastic, they cannot have causal ecacy, but they can be causally rel-
evant. at is, they can play a causal role in a “light” sense of causation:
i.e. any successful explanation or prediction in mental terms suggests the
existence of causally ecacious processes in the natural basis. is is quite
consistent with interpretivism because the suggestion is not about any spe-
cic ecacious processes. It is just that the canonical ascriptions of mental
causes implicate that something causally ecacious occurs in the brain.
Perception is importantly dierent from beliefs and other propositional
attitudes. Chapter 8 attempts to extend the ascriptionist approach to percep-
tual states and their contents, thereby showing that the account can recog-
nise the specicity of perception, at least as far as vision is concerned. e
other modalities of perception are not considered in the chapter separately,
but it is assumed that they do not pose principled diculties for interpre-
tivism either. e topics examined in this chapter include the factivity of
perception, non-conceptual content and the phenomenal aspects of expe-
rience. Factivity gives rise to one necessary condition for the canonical as-
cription of factive perceptual states: namely, that the relevant fact obtains.
Non-conceptual content is a useful notion for the purpose of making sense
of the following case: sometimes we want to say that a subject has mental
states with contents such that the subject does not possess the concepts used
to characterise the content. It is argued that the ascription theory can ac-
commodate such cases if they are understood in terms of what contents are
ascribable to one. e phenomenal features of experience are conceived as
stemming from what it is like to have certain brain processes. It is suggested
that the peculiar properties of experience (such as continuousness and in-
eability) are a result of the presentational format of certain brain processes.
By denition, this part of experience is not fully captured by any ascription,
and hence the having of this aspect of experience, just like the having of brain
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processes, is not ascription-dependent. At the same time, it is possible to sit-
uate the phenomenal features of experience, thus understood, in relation to
the ascription theory, and this is done in the last section of Chapter 8.
How could an interpretivist make sense of self-knowledge? In partic-
ular, does interpretivism contain resources that suce to explain the rst-
person authority that lies beneath the intuitive dierence between knowing
one’s own minds and the minds of others? Chapter 9 presents a model of
self-knowledge, which is compatible with the ascription theory and which
provides a reliabilist basis for the folk presumption of rst-person author-
ity. Why do the folk presume that people are right about their minds? Why
do we assume that if one says that one has a certain mental state, then one
has it?e answer is that one’s self-ascriptions normally match with what is
canonically ascribable to one. is follows from the nature of subpersonal
processes. Specically, the brain is a kind of system that generates actions
in response to environmental stimuli, given the context of one’s personal
idiosyncrasies. As a result, these actions turn out to be broadly congruent
with the environment, with one’s previous and concurrent reactions as well
as with one’s personal background. One’s self-ascriptions (including verbal
reports of one’s mental states) are also among such coherent actions. Since
canonical ascription aims at a coherent interpretation of the subject in light
of the same sort of information, thematch between the canonical ascriptions
and actual self-ascriptions is notmiraculous at all. In that respect, the coher-
ence is not something merely imputed in the interpretation, but has a basis
in the natural processes of the brain-environment interaction. Of course, as
with all mechanisms, they can sometimes go wrong, and in those cases, the
self-ascriptions fail to meet the canonicality standard.
is short overview could only identify the main topics and introduce
the very basics of the ideas developed in Mind Ascribed. It goes without
saying that the full arguments, the further elaborations and the necessary
references can be found in the book itself.
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